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Abstract Entrepreneurial finance markets are in a
dynamic state. New market niches and players have
developed and continue to emerge. The rules of the
game and the methods for receiving financial back-
ing have changed in many ways. This editorial and
the special issue of Small Business Economics focus
on crowdfunding (CF) and initial coin offerings
(ICOs), which are two distinct but important entre-
preneurial finance market segments of the future.
Although the two market segments initially appear
to be similar, we identify differences between them.
Our comparison focuses on the stakeholders, micro-
s t r uc tu r e s , r egu l a t o ry env i ronmen t s , and
development of the markets. We conclude with sug-
gestions for future ICO and CF research.
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1 Introduction
Technological development and regulation and the rise
of social media had tremendous effects on the
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entrepreneurial finance market. New players and new
financial intermediaries have emerged that increase fi-
nancing opportunities for entrepreneurial ventures
(Block et al. 2018). Crowdfunding (CF) in its various
forms has developed into a standard tool for raising seed
capital in some industries, while new funding instru-
ments, such as initial coin offerings (ICOs),1 have only
recently become available and started to receive entre-
preneurs’ attention (Fisch 2019; Kher et al. 2020). Sim-
ilar to the way in which CF has made its way into the
toolbox of entrepreneurs, ICOs and similar offerings
have the potential to shape the entrepreneurial finance
markets of the future. However, these offerings also
entail challenges. For example, ICOs are based on
decentralized blockchain technology, which raises ques-
tions about international legal standardization, harmoni-
zation, and regulation (Huang et al. 2019).
This editorial and the accompanying special issue
intend to increase our understanding of these two new
segments of the entrepreneurial finance market. Al-
though initially, CF and ICOs appear to be very similar
in their characteristics and mechanisms, there are mean-
ingful differences between the two funding tools. Entre-
preneurs and investors need to understand these differ-
ences to use these funding methods in the most efficient
way. The same applies to policymakers who are asked to
define an appropriate regulatory framework for the two
financing instruments.
This editorial aims to define and describe the two
new types of matchmakers in the digital entrepreneurial
ecosystem (Sussan and Acs 2017) and to structure them.
CF and, more recently, ICOs have attracted much atten-
tion in the academic literature. These instruments are the
topic of the majority of the most frequently cited papers
published over the last 5 years in top entrepreneurship
journals. The most cited paper published in Small Busi-
ness Economics from 2015 (Vismara 2016) is on CF. Of
the ten most frequently downloaded papers in 2019 that
were published in Small Business Economics in 2017–
2019, five are about CF and fintech. These papers
received approximately 30,000 downloads.
Unlike in the more traditional entrepreneurial finance
segments, such as the venture capital (VC) or initial
public offering (IPO) market, the USA does not domi-
nate. Some of the equity CF platforms with the largest
transaction volume are based in Europe. This is partly
due to regulatory effects. Although the Jumpstart Our
Business Startups (JOBS) Act, which was signed into
law on April 5, 2012, introduced CF as a means for
entrepreneurs to raise equity financing in the USA, these
markets were ultimately regulated by the SEC starting in
2015 and became effective on May 16, 2016
(Cummings et al. 2019). By contrast, CF developed in
Europe in 2012. Overall, the empirical setting of most
papers on equity CF is Europe.
A call for papers soliciting submissions for this spe-
cial issue was posted online in December 2017. Then,
papers were selected for a special issue workshop at
EMLYON Business School (France) on June 6, 2018.
The Entrepreneurial Finance Conference (ENTFIN
Conference) in Milan, Italy, followed in June 2018, with
a special track dedicated to paper presentations for this
special issue. Finally, we held the 6th Crowdinvesting
Symposium on July 20, 2018, at the Max Planck Insti-
tute for Innovation and Competition in Munich, Germa-
ny. These events were attended, in total, by more than
200 entrepreneurial finance scholars. All submissions
underwent a double-blind review process that led to the
selection of nine papers that qualified for publication in
this special issue.
The remainder of this editorial is as follows. We first
define and describe the two new segments of the entre-
preneurial finance markets. Subsequently, we compare
both segments focusing on the respective stakeholders,
market mechanism, regulatory environment, and devel-
opment. Subsequently, we summarize the nine contri-
butions selected for the special issue, provide an overall
research outlook, and provide a brief conclusion.
2 How do ICOs compare to CF?
2.1 Definitions
We define ICOs as in Fisch et al. (2019) and Huang et al.
(2019). An ICO is an event where a venture sells tokens
to a crowd using distributed ledger technologies (DLTs),
such as blockchain technology. Tokens are units of
value and can provide utility (utility tokens) or resemble
securities (security tokens). The former offers the right
to use the products or services of the venture, whereas
the latter makes the buyer a debt or equity holder and
allows her to participate in the value increase of the
venture or provides other financial incentives (e.g., in-
terest or preferred dividends). Accordingly, we
1 We use the term initial coin offering (ICO) throughout the paper. This
term includes so-called security-token offerings (STOs).
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distinguish between ICO utility and security token is-
sues. The latter are also referred to as security token
offerings (STOs). CF is defined as a form of fundraising,
via the Internet, whereby people pool money, usually
small individual contributions, to support a particular
goal (Ahlers et al. 2015). Additionally, for CF, we focus
on the distinction between reward-based and equity CF.
We differentiate the two fundraising instruments
using four questions: Who are the stakeholders of the
market segments? How do the markets function? What
is the regulatory environment, and finally, how did these
market segments emerge and develop? Table 1 summa-
rizes this comparison.2
2.2 Who are the stakeholders?
2.2.1 Proponents
Who are the proponents in CF and ICOs? A key differ-
ence between reward-based and equity CF is that
reward-based campaigns can be launched by private
individuals or firms. Equity CF campaigns exclusively
originate from firms (Cumming et al. 2019a; Vismara
2018).
Proponents in both reward-based and equity CF op-
erate in a wide range of traditional sectors. For example,
most projects on Kickstarter (a reward-based CF plat-
form) are related to games, design, technology, film and
video, music, fashion, publishing food, and art.3 Simi-
larly, projects on Seedrs (an equity CF platform) often
relate to food and beverage, finance and payments,
home and personal, software as a service, platform as a
service, and travel, leisure, and sports.4 CF projects
should not be overly complex because “the crowd” has
low incentives and capabilities to perform in-depth due
diligence (Cumming et al. 2019c). Consistent with this
view, Chan and Parhankangas (2017) show that more
radically innovative Kickstarter projects—which are
riskier to develop and more difficult for the crowd to
understand—exhibit less favorable funding outcomes.
Similar to reward-based CF, utility token ICOs can be
initiated by firms or individuals. Analogous to equity
CF, STOs are limited to firms because they relate to the
issuance of debt or equity. Similar to CF, ICOs take
place in a broad range of sectors. However, contrary to
CF, ICOs often relate to financial services, high-tech
bus ine s s se rv i ce s , p l a t fo rm deve lopmen t ,
cryptocurrencies, and smart contracts (Adhami et al.
2018). ICO business models are often based on
blockchain technology and are therefore more complex.
ICOs also take place in more traditional sectors, such as
entertainment, health, food, and education. However,
these types of ICOs are rare and small in terms of the
funding amounts raised.5
2.2.2 Backers
Who are the backers of CF and ICOs? In reward-based
CF, the crowd provides funding to a campaign in ex-
change for a promise of a future reward (Mollick 2014).
In equity CF, the crowd injects money via an issue of
equity (Ahlers et al. 2015). Contrary to reward-based
CF, it is not the interest in a product or service but the
expected financial returns that are the primary drivers
for backer engagement in equity CF (Ahlers et al. 2015;
Cumming and Johan 2013).
Reward-based CF is broadly accessible to everyone.
However, on equity CF platforms, access can be limited
to accredited investors only. Even if there is no accred-
itation requirement, the investment limits can vary based
on the income or net worth of individuals, contingent on
the prevailing legislation.
Members of the crowd are not only private individ-
uals. There is evidence that both professional venture
capitalists (VCs) and semiprofessional angel investors
are active members of equity CF platforms. For exam-
ple, Kleinert et al. (2020) show that out of 221 firms
running equity CF campaigns on Crowdcube in 2017
and 2018, almost 50% raised previous funding. This
prior funding was raised from business angels (for 66
firms), fromVCs (for 33 firms), on CF platforms (for 31
firms), and from government grants (for 19 firms). Ven-
tures that did not raise prior capital show a success rate
of 41% compared with a 72% success rate for ventures
that previously received external capital. Despite these
important links between equity CF, VC, and angel in-
vestment, the literature remains largely segmented. We
know relatively little about why business angels and
VCs start selecting firms through equity CF platforms
and not via their usual deal flow channels. Given that
VCs anticipate finding low-quality rather than high-
2 See Ackermann et al. (2020) for a similar comparison.
3 https://www.kickstarter.com/help/stats (accessed December 6, 2019).
4 See https://learn-cdn.seedrs.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09
/21134223/Seedrs_-PortfolioUpdate_Autumn2018.pdf (accessed
December 6, 2019). 5 See https://icobench.com/stats (accessed December 6, 2019).
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quality start-ups on CF platforms (Mödl 2019), we are
puzzled by which types of VCs are screening deals on
CF platforms, whether and why they push their portfolio
firms to equity CF platforms, and how the crowd, VCs,
and business angels interact post-investment.
In a utility token issue, a venture sells tokens with the
promise that these tokens will have some utility in the
future. In an STO, the tokens that are sold are deemed
securities (equity or debt). This is similar to the differ-
ence between reward- and equity-based CF. However,
there is an important difference. Utility tokens are more
easily traded compared with rewards from CF cam-
paigns. Therefore, utility tokens can attract financially
motivated investors. Recent evidence by Fisch et al.
(2019) shows that technological motives are the most
important investment rationale for ICO investors,
followed by financial and ideological motives. Accord-
ingly, ICOs are expected to attract more technology-
interested investors compared with CF campaigns.
VCs also participate in ICOs.6 This observation raises
questions about the types of VCs that subscribe to ICOs
and their rationale.
2.2.3 Platforms
What is the role of platforms as intermediaries in CF
versus ICOs? Platforms and their design play an impor-
tant role in the CF market segment (Belleflamme et al.
2015). The platforms are the marketplaces that match
demand with supply of funds and provide facilities for
the exchange of information among investors and entre-
preneurs. Some of the platforms aim to ensure a certain
level of quality of the CF projects and to reduce infor-
mation asymmetries (Belleflamme et al. 2015). To avoid
the presence of suspect investments and to guarantee a
certain quality of the advertised projects, some plat-
forms force the project initiators to be transparent about
their venture and the entrepreneurial team. Moreover,
some platforms introduce an application process where
project initiators need to meet certain criteria and pro-
vide particular information to be eligible to be listed on
the platform. The specific requirements differ among
platforms and depend on the particular CF type. For
example, equity CF platforms require a more compre-
hensive description of the business model, the venture
team, and the financial characteristics, and they some-
6 https://techcrunch.com/2018/09/12/icos-are-increasingly-just-for-
venture-capitalists/ (accessed December 6, 2019)T
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times conduct background checks. In addition to signal-
ing and certification function, the platforms offer clear-
ing services. These services help reduce transaction
costs and avoid ethical problems with project initiators.
The role of ICO platforms is not yet well defined.
There are websites to inform potential investors about
ongoing ICO campaigns. Such websites could be con-
sidered platforms or marketplaces bringing together
supply and demand. However, unlike typical CF plat-
forms, these websites do not act as gatekeepers that aim
to maintain a certain project quality. These websites also
do not provide direct matching or clearing services.
Transaction closing and payment processing is
decentralized via blockchain technology. In fact, the
original idea of ICOs was to not have centralized au-
thorities matching supply with demand but to use tech-
nology that allows matching in a decentralized network.
To summarize, platforms and the associated network
effects play an important role in CF but are currently
of minor importance in ICOs.
2.3 How do the markets function?
2.3.1 Selection of projects
In most cases, there is no meaningful difference in the
pre-process of selecting projects that qualify for CF or
ICOs. Potential CF projects are posted online on a
platform. Thus, the portals perform a selection. Some
portals claim to perform an accurate screening and due
diligence, while others define their role as a facilitator
and clearing house. For example, the US platform
Wefunder reports on its website that they “…don’t want
Wefunder to be a gatekeeper that picks and chooses
which ideas are worthy of funding. That’s for you to
decide.”7 Nevertheless, most of the platforms worry
about their reputational capital and use selection criteria
to choose projects.
The platforms are heterogeneous with respect to
funding models due diligence practices, offering dura-
tion, services offered, corporate governance and
offering-related conditions, and finally, their fees.
There are only a few papers on the heterogeneity of
CF platforms. Rossi and Vismara (2018) describe the
regulation and development process of equity CF in
France, Italy, Germany, and the UK. Using a sample of
127 platforms in these countries, these authors
document which services are offered to proponents
before, during, and after the campaigns. These authors
find that a higher number of postcampaign services
offered by the platforms increase the annual number of
successful campaigns. Services offered before and
during campaigns do not attract more campaigns to the
platforms. Rossi et al. (2019) focus on the corporate
governance aspects in equity CF. The cross-platform
analysis reveals a large variety of corporate governance
mechanisms, particularly with regard to the voting rights
of investors. Some platforms assign voting rights to
individual investors, some work under a nominee
structure, and some require the involvement of
accredited investors to list offerings. Comparing
platforms globally, these authors find that the
assignment of individual voting rights is associated
with lower chances of success of the platforms,
whereas the delivery of pooled voting rights is not
significant. Cumming et al. (2019c) evaluate the factors
associated with platforms’ compliance expenses and
their due diligence application. These authors find that
due diligence is related to legislation requirements, plat-
form size, and CF campaign type or complexity.
Despite these differences, all CF platforms act as
direct intermediaries between potential investors and
project proponents. As such, CF platforms govern the
fundraising process by setting their particular platform
rules in compliance with the regulation of the country in
which they are based. ICO markets function differently.
ICO markets provide a disintermediated way to raise
capital. ICOs are not listed on platforms. There are
websites that provide aggregate information and guid-
ance, including expert ratings. However, ICOs are direct
issues without intermediaries. As such, screening and
due diligence are entirely left to individual investors.
2.3.2 The impact of monitoring and value added
by funders
It is in an investor’s interest to perform an ex-ante
selection among potential investments and to ex-post
monitor and provide value-adding services to an
investee. With regard to the impact of monitoring and
value adding, the importance of the participation of
private investors in CF campaigns or ICOs is arguably
lower than the importance of the participation of profes-
sional VCs or semiprofessional business angels. Indi-
vidual private investors presumably lack the expertise
7 https://help.wefunder.com/getting-started-for-investors (accessed
December 6, 2019)
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and incentive to maintain close relationships with the
management of the firms that they back. Furthermore,
private investors usually do not have the particular con-
tractual information and control rights that professional
investors and business angels require as prerequisites for
an investment. Nevertheless, while backers in reward-
based CF expect only to receive a reward, often of little
objective value, investors participating in equity CF
campaigns and in STOs are concerned with the perfor-
mance of their investments. However, unlike with
reward-based CF, the backers of utility token issues
are also interested in the financial performance of their
investment. Utility tokens are tradable and exposed to
price fluctuations, which attracts financially motivated
and speculative investors. Actors on reward-based CF
platforms, in turn, are expected not to have financial
and, thus, monitoring interests but rather might provide
support to entrepreneurs in terms of feedback. If a
campaign has numerous supporters, this can be
interpreted as proof of marketability of the product or
service that the proponents aim to deliver.
Equity CF investors sometimes obtain voting rights.
Obtaining voting rights is contingent on the jurisdiction
and the platform. Some platforms operate under a nom-
inee structure. These platforms hold the voting power of
the crowd and exercise monitoring and voting on the
crowd’s behalf. Other platforms assign voting rights
directly to investors. There are some equity CF plat-
forms on which sophisticated investors participate.
These investors are usually particularly concerned about
their voting and control rights (Cumming et al. 2019b).
Nevertheless, despite the reluctance of CF investors to
become actively involved in controlling and managing
their investees, they are, as other shareholders, interested
in their future proceeds.
2.3.3 Marketing- and innovation-related benefits
CF research emphasizes that project initiators regard CF
asmore than a financial source. Project initiators are also
attracted by the marketing and innovation-related as-
pects of CF (Da Cruz 2018; Block et al. 2018). By
setting up a CF campaign, the initiator gains valuable
information from potential future customers about de-
sirable product features, product pricing, and product
distribution strategies. Moreover, founders have the
chance to introduce the product to the market and its
customers without even having produced it yet. This
early introduction creates awareness, helps to build and
establish a brand, and reduces the uncertainty related to
the marketing of new and innovative products.
Backers have different roles and functions. Backers
are not only early investors but also a valuable source of
information. Backers may even turn into product pro-
moters and opinion leaders helping to spread the word
about the CF product and its features. This practice
helps the project initiators cross the chasm from the
group of early adopters to the mass market. Such
marketing-related benefits of CF exist primarily with
reward-based campaigns and to a lesser extent with
equity CF. To date, little research exists about the
marketing-related benefits of ICOs. However, given
the similarities and the analogies between reward-
based CF and utility token-based ICOs, we would ex-
pect marketing-related benefits to also play a significant
role in utility token issues. Marketing-related benefits
might even be of higher importance for utility token
ICOs given that tokens are a sort of presale of a
blockchain-based product or service.
2.3.4 Fraud resistance
The emergence of new entrepreneurial finance market
segments that connect entrepreneurs and nonprofession-
al investors globally via an Internet connection raises
concerns about low-quality projects and fraud. Mollick
(2014) shows that fraud is rare in reward-based CF, with
only 2.3–3.6% of Kickstarter projects showing indica-
tions of potential fraud. Cumming et al. (2019d) provide
an in-depth analysis of fraud in reward-based CF and
conclude that “[…] CF fraud is a rare event, despite
apparent widespread skepticism by the media, politi-
cians, and regulators.” Hence, the CF community is
often able to detect cases of fraud, and online market-
places may facilitate such detection. To varying degrees,
CF platforms also perform due diligence before projects
are listed on the platform (Cumming et al. 2019c).
However, such due diligence is more prominent on
larger platforms, notably on equity and lending CF
platforms.
Contrary to CF, ICOs are clearly less fraud resistant.
Industry reports suggest that 80% of the number of ICOs
could be identified as scams.8 Nevertheless, these re-
ports highlight that only 10% of the overall ICO
fundraising volume was allocated to later identified
8 https://research.bloomberg.com/pub/res/d28giW28tf6G7T_Wr77
aU0gDgFQ
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scams and the majority of these funds actually went to
three projects. In addition to these three projects, iden-
tified scams collected just $30 million or approximately
0.3% of all-time ICO fundraising. Hornuf et al. (2019)
provide a more detailed analysis of fraud in ICOs. These
authors suggest that in contrast to the findings for CF
(Cumming et al. 2019d), the extent of information dis-
closure offers little opportunity to identify possible fraud
cases. Contrary to utility token issues, security token–
based ICOs distribute securities representing financial
claims on assets. Accordingly, STOs are governed by
security law and protected by collateral. Thus, STOs
provide additional insurance against fraud and
manipulation.
The differences in fraud levels and fraud detection in
the new entrepreneurial finance market segments raise
questions about whether and why individuals are better
at identifying scams in some markets relative to others
and about the role of platform due diligence versus the
wisdom of the crowd. This question becomes increas-
ingly important because, more recently, ICOs have been
conducted through exchanges, which can have a selec-
tion function. Such issues are called initial exchange
offerings (IEOs).
2.4 How are the markets regulated?
The regulation of CF and ICOs is largely contingent on
the offering characteristics. In reward-based CF, issuers
typically offer consumers the ability to prepurchase a
product or service. If the campaign creator has been
fraudulent, many jurisdictions provide common law or
general civil law actions, which allow backers to recover
what they initially pledged. The same actions can be
taken if a fraudulent issuer created a utility token as part
of an ICO that was meant to prepurchase a product or
service on a newly created platform. Some countries
have specific legislation on the new entrepreneurial
finance markets. For example, in the USA, the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) has jurisdiction when goods
are sold via a CF or ICO platform. Government agencies
and courts can also impose monetary penalties on fraud-
ulent campaign creators. When financial securities are
sold, the general securities laws apply, which allows
investors and the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) to bring legal actions. What constitutes a security
depends on how the offering is structured. In the USA,
securities are defined under the Securities Act § 2(a)(1)
or the Exchange Act § 3(a)(10). Whether an ICO
constitutes a security largely depends on the business
model of the issuer and is usually determined by apply-
ing the Howey test; that is, an offering involves a secu-
rity if investors invest their money in a common enter-
prise and are led to expect profits solely from the efforts
of the promoter or a third party. Donation- and reward-
based CF do not involve the sale of securities, while
equity CF and STOs do, by definition.
Most importantly, in many jurisdictions, issuers in
equity CF campaigns and STOs must inform investors
about the offer by means of a securities prospectus.
Drafting such a prospectus is costly, and issuers on
equity CF platforms might be reluctant to pay the costs
of drafting such a prospectus. For that reason, regulators
around the world have implemented exemptions from
the requirement to draft a securities prospectus for small
offerings (Hornuf and Schwienbacher 2017). Given that
STOs raise larger amounts of capital on average, the
need to exempt issuers from the requirement to draft a
securities prospectus might be less severe. Moreover,
because fraud is more prevalent in ICOs, investor pro-
tection can be improved by an appropriate market de-
sign. In this context, Hornuf et al. (2019) require sophis-
ticated investors and platforms to certify the quality of
ICO issuers. This requirement has proven to be helpful
on equity CF platforms where such certifications are
voluntary.
An alternative investor protection measure is to limit
the individual amount at risk in a single issue or the
overall market. Comparable regulation was passed in
many jurisdictions for equity CF but not for reward-
based CF. ICO investors might be subject to those limits
once a regulation passes in the future. An individual’s
amount at risk on equity CF platforms can be restricted
contingent on the investor’s freely available assets and
monthly net income. In the USA, unsophisticated inves-
tors may invest up to US$2000 but are never allowed to
invest more than US$100,000, independent of their
annual income and net assets.
Reward-based CF and ICOs rely on disintermedia-
tion. However, for the other new entrepreneurial finance
market segments, regulation of intermediaries exists and
differs significantly across jurisdictions. In the USA or
Germany, among other jurisdictions, equity CF issuers
can only benefit from the exemption of the prospectus
requirement if they tap the market through such an
intermediary. In France, for example, platforms need
to obtain a license from the securities regulator because
they are considered financial intermediaries and are
J. H. Block et al.
therefore subject to a specific set of rules (Hornuf and
Schwienbacher 2017). In Germany, by contrast, reward-
and equity-based CF platforms are generally only lightly
regulated under trade law. In some jurisdictions, plat-
forms are required to file with a register, while in others,
they are not. Little research exists on how regulation
affects the quality of CF and ICOs.
Finally, the contract types differ largely among the
different forms of CF and ICOs. In the case of reward-
based CF and utility token offerings, consumers often
prepurchase a product or service, which implies that
they strike a contract under trade law. In equity CF and
security ICOs, investors hold rights in a corporation by
holding financial securities or other forms of invest-
ments. While in the early days of ICOs, the issuers
sometimes claimed that ICOs constituted a “new” and
“unregulated” asset class, regulators around the world
have nowmade clear that ICOs can constitute securities,
and a white paper is not considered a substitute for a
securities prospectus.9
2.5 How did the markets emerge and develop?
CF markets have shown fast growth, although double-
digit growth rates have slowed down over time.
Reward-based CF platforms, such as Indiegogo and
Kickstarter, emerged in 2008/2009. The cumulative
amount of funding pledged to Kickstarter projects, for
example, was approximately $276million by July 2012,
$1 billion by March 2014, $2 billion by October 2015,
$3 billion by April 2017, and over $4 billion by January
2019.10 The UK equity CF market grew from £84
million in 2014, to £245million in 2015, to £272million
in 2016, and to £333 million in 2017.11 The outlook is
that the global CF market will exhibit slower but steady
growth over time.12
Contrary to CF markets, ICO activity has seen sharp-
er growth and, recently, also rapid decline (Masiak et al.
2019). For example, the first ICO (i.e., Mastercoin)
emerged in July 2013 (Fisch 2019). After very little
ICO activity for the rest of 2013, 2014, and 2015, the
ICO market exhibited a jump in 2017, when entrepre-
neurs raised an estimated $6.5 billion. In 2018, an
estimated $21.6 billion was raised. However, the data
until October 2019 suggest that the ICO market signif-
icantly cooled because only $3.2 billion had been
raised.13
Overall, CF and ICO markets exhibit significant dif-
ferences in their development over time and volatility
with respect to their volumes. It would be interesting to
analyze why these market segments have developed
differently.
3 The papers in this special issue
The descriptions of new entrepreneurial finance markets
above suggest to open questions and requirements for
further research. These open questions were the motiva-
tion of a public call for papers for this special issue of
Small Business Economics on CF, blockchain technol-
ogy, and ICOs. After a double-blind peer review pro-
cess, nine papers qualified for publication in this special
issue. These papers are summarized in the subsequent
section. One paper addresses a crosslink of new entre-
preneurial finance markets, namely, fintechs providing
various financing sources for young ventures. Four pa-
pers focus on various questions related to CF. Three
papers elaborate on ICOs. These eight papers are em-
pirical. The ninth paper is a theoretical contribution and
discusses blockchain technology in relation to smart
contracts. The research questions, theoretical frame-
work, empirical settings, and key findings of the special
issue papers are presented in Table 2.
3.1 Fintech clusters
Industries are geographically concentrated, and it is
questionable why the degree of this concentration is so
large. Marshall (1920) argues that benefits of geograph-
ic clustering reflect the gain of reduced transport cost
and emphasizes three types of such cost: the costs of
moving goods, people, and ideas. Firms locate near
suppliers and customers to reduce shipping costs. A
second reason to agglomerate is to take advantage of
scale economies resulting from a large labor pool. Third,
the speed of the flow of ideas is a criterion for firms to
9 See https://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-81207.pdf.
(accessed December 6, 2019)
10 See https://www.statista.com/statistics/310218/total-kickstarter-
funding/ (accessed December 6, 2019).
1 1 S e e h t t p s : / / www. j b s . c am . a c . u k / f i l e a dm i n / u s e r _
upload/research/centres/alternative-finance/downloads/2018-5th-uk-
alternative-finance-industry-report.pdf (accessed December 6, 2019).
1 2 S e e h t t p s : / / www. s t a t i s t a . c om / o u t l o o k / 3 3 5 / 1 0 0
/crowdfunding/worldwide (accessed December 6, 2019).
13 See https://www.coinschedule.com/stats (accessed December 6,
2019).
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collocate, as agents can learn skills more quickly from
each other in an industrial cluster. Ellison et al. (2010)
provide strong support for these three drivers to be
important for the explanation of industrial agglomera-
tion. Audretsch and Feldman (1996) elaborate on the
spatial distribution of innovation and potential spillover
effects. These authors conclude that industry sectors
where knowledge spillovers are more likely, i.e.,
where industry R&D, university research, and skilled
labor are most important, have a greater tendency to
cluster than sectors where this is not the case. Feldman
(1994) finds that the effect is more pronounced for small
firms, while Acs and Audretsch (1988, 1990) highlight
that small firms are the major driver of innovation. Acs
et al. (1992, 1994) reveal that R&D expenses by private
corporations and universities spill over for third-party
firms to exploit. Under these circumstances, we witness
geographic agglomeration and new venture creation,
especially in intellectual and innovative centers where
a strong academic community is present at the same
time. The literature often refers to Silicon Valley as a
well-known example, as described in Saxenian (1996).
The paper by Gazel and Schwienbacher (2018) elab-
orates on fintech clusters in France. The focus on a
relatively new and knowledge-intensive industry that
is free of the physical transport of goods provides a great
identification strategy to verify Marshall’s (1920) theo-
ry. Since fintechs operate independently of their location
via newmedia channels andweb technology, the driving
forces of cluster building must be reduced to transfer
talent and the exchange and spillover of new ideas.
Gazel and Schwienbacher (2018) examine the impact
of specific socioeconomic drivers on the formation of
fintech clusters. These authors raise the interesting re-
search question of whether large fintech clusters encour-
age additional start-up activity or if the effect is the
opposite. A greater number of incumbents could in-
crease competition and thus deter new entrants. Along
the same line, cluster building could affect the harvest-
ing capabilities of entrepreneurs. Access to finance and,
related to that, entrepreneurial exit opportunities could
be different in large fintech clusters comparedwith those
in regions with little collocation. The authors gather data
for 972 fintech start-ups located in France. The data
span the period 2000 to 2018 and include all major
sectors within the fintech industry. The paper finds the
following important results. Cluster-building is a very
strong phenomenon in the fintech industry. Larger clus-
ters attract new entrants instead of discouraging entry.
The effect is more pronounced in clusters with higher
numbers of incubators at the same time. The risk of
failure is reduced in larger clusters, and entrepreneurs
receive higher rewards via acquisitions. The authors
note that this phenomenon seems to be caused by the
proximity to competitors and potential buyers. Finally,
incubators reduce the risk of failure.
In summary, Gazel and Schwienbacher (2018) reveal
that clustering is still an important phenomenon, perhaps
more important than ever, even in decentralized and
information-driven technology that is free of any physical
transfer of goods. The decision regardingwhere to place a
venture’s headquarters needs to be made with care and
with consideration of the benefits of collocation with
peers. Public policy to support cluster-building and to
establish incubator programs seems warranted.
3.2 CF
The immanent information asymmetry between entre-
preneurs and investors and the resulting agency cost are
also the subject of the paper by Goethner et al. (2020).
Since crowd investors are usually less experienced in
evaluating business plans compared with professional
investors, the problem of information asymmetry is
especially pronounced on equity CF platforms
(Vismara 2019). The paper elaborates on a set of
16,666 investments into 28 projects made by 7474
investors on Companisto, which is a German CF plat-
form. The authors perform a cluster analysis, sorting
investors based on similarities in their previous invest-
ment histories. These authors aim to determine typical
investor profiles and investment strategies and to distin-
guish three motivations among CF investors: financial,
social, and community benefits. The authors also cap-
ture the experience and degree of sophistication of their
sample of investors. In this way, the authors can identify
three distinct groups that they name “sophisticated in-
vestors,” “crowd enthusiasts,” and “casual investors.”
These CF investor types react in distinctive ways to
project quality signals sent by entrepreneurs. They also
show different herding behaviors contingent on the in-
formation received about the investment decisions of
fellow investors. The paper contributes to the growing
literature of how different audiences acquire and inter-
pret distinct signals differently (Vanacker and Forbes
2016).
Goethner et al. (2020) formulate hypotheses about
the relation between the reception of human and
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entrepreneurial quality signals and the investment deci-
sions of the distinctive groups of CF investors. The
hypotheses notably build on Becker (1964), Ahlers
et al. (2015), Cumming et al. (2020), Piva and Rossi-
Lamastra (2018), Bapna (2019), Epstein and Schneider
(2008), and Vismara (2018). The insight gained into the
heterogeneity of CF investors, their motivations to fund
campaigns, and their response to quality signals is im-
portant for the design of CF platforms and for entrepre-
neurs. Policymakers need to trade off investor protection
against their interest to stimulate start-up activities and
should focus on setting appropriate information stan-
dards. For example, policymakers can require improv-
ing the platform design to alleviate information trans-
mission from knowledgeable CF investors to less-
informed investors. The findings of Goethner et al.
(2020) confirm that sophisticated investors are a part
of the crowd and that they are the active investors on
these platforms. Regulation could create the prerequi-
sites for knowledge spillovers. These spillovers would
be beneficial for entrepreneurs and the investment com-
munity alike.
Moedl (this issue) investigates potential contract-
related deal-breaker terms of professional venture inves-
tors when deciding whether to invest in equity
crowdfunded ventures. Using a mixed method approach
of qualitative interviews and a quantitative survey with
VCs and business angels from Germany, Moedl finds
that such deal-breaker terms indeed exist and influence
the investment decisions of professional venture inves-
tors. An example of such terms is the nonexistence of a
drag-along clause: an inflated capitalization table owing
to crowd investors holding direct securities and redemp-
tion and voting rights by the crowd. The paper contrib-
utes to the growing literature of how CF can be com-
bined with other sources of entrepreneurial finance
(Block et al. 2018; Drover et al. 2017).
Signaling theory (e.g., Connelly et al. 2011; Spence
1973) has served in the CF context to model how
proponents can signal unobservable quality to investors.
When proponents signal their high quality (e.g., through
human, social or intellectual capital), it reduces infor-
mational asymmetry and therefore increases the success
of CF campaigns (Ahlers et al. 2015). Signaling theory
has largely focused on those signals that are assumed to
be both observable and costly to imitate by low-quality
firms, but signals can differ in the extent to which they
are correlated with unobservable firm quality (e.g.,
Colombo et al. 2019; Vanacker et al. 2019). Indeed, a
largely separate stream of literature has focused on
entrepreneurial storytelling, which sometimes “re-pres-
ent” the facts, and indicates that properly crafted stories
can also serve as informational cues that foster entrepre-
neurial resource acquisition (e.g., Martens et al. 2007).
Cappa et al. (2020) connect these two streams of the
literature using the reward-based CF context. Specifi-
cally, these authors examine how two main narrative
styles—“results in progress” (RIP), emphasizing the
quality and features of the product-reward, and “ongo-
ing journey” (OJ), emphasizing the values and vision
that inspired the undertaking of the entrepreneurial
project—influence fundraising. These authors further
examine the role of previous reward-based CF experi-
ence and how such experience interacts with narrative
styles to influence fundraising. The results of this study
indicate that backers pledge more money to CF cam-
paigns that are communicated through RIP narrative
styles rather than OJ styles. Moreover, in addition to
the positive effect of previous experience, these authors
find that entrepreneurs with extensive experience in
reward-based CF attract more pledges by adopting OJ
narratives rather than RIP narratives.
Proelss et al. (this issue) focus on healthcare
CF, which is defined as a method to raise funds
for medical expenses or treatment by a group of
mostly small donors through an open call for
funding on Internet-based platforms. CF platforms
(and social entrepreneurship more broadly) play an
increasingly important role in addressing large so-
cietal challenges, including lack of access to es-
sential healthcare services. Using data from Watsi.
org, these authors find that campaigns that started
near religious holidays, such as Christmas or
Easter, raise the necessary funding more quickly.
Interestingly, contributions by donors with public
profiles crowd out subsequent contributions by
their peers (other donors with public profiles).
Contrary to equity CF, these authors further find
that donors with public profiles are less likely to
donate if the average reputation of the previous
donors is higher than theirs. Overall , the
theoretical framework the authors have developed
and empirically tested for donation-based CF dif-
fers substantially from existing frameworks and
previous evidence tailored to reward-based and
equity CF. These findings also have important
practical implications because they provide new
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insight into how to increase donations and enhance
overall social entrepreneurship.
3.3 ICOs
In ICOs, entrepreneurs raise external capital through the
issuance of blockchain-based tokens. Ideally, transaction
costs are low, investor outreach is global, and coins can
be traded in a liquid secondary market after issuance. On
the other hand, and typical for the entrepreneurial finance
context, ICOs are characterized by a large degree of
information asymmetry between issuers and investors,
thus yielding a substantial risk of agency problems and
cost. Therefore, ICO ventures need to send strong quality
signals to the ICO investment community to secure
fundraising. However, it is not clear what kinds of sig-
nals are appropriate for this purpose. Momtaz (2020)
examines a proxy for agency conflicts that is commonly
used in social psychology, namely, loyalty. Momtaz
measures the loyalty of entrepreneurs by the number of
previous positions they held in proportion to their cumu-
lative job experience in years. The overarching hypoth-
esis is that their loyalty positively impacts ICO success in
terms of underpricing, gross proceeds, operational effi-
ciency, and entrepreneurial failure.
Loyalty affects decision-making, and therefore the
manifestation of agency costs, in different ways.
Akerlof and Kranton (2005) model this as follows. First,
loyalty has an influence on an individual’s utility gain.
Second, loyalty affects the subjective probabilities of
possible states of the world, which are used for decision
making. Overall, the positive impact of loyalty on
agents’ utility gain is expected to reduce agency costs
from asymmetric information in the ICO market. The
rationale is that entrepreneurs who have demonstrated
loyalty in the past signal, on average, quality relation-
ships with their former principals. This finding is
interpreted as a lower potential to cause future agency
costs and should therefore attract investors.
Momtaz (2020) collects data for more than 2000
ICOs from several appropriate platforms and gathers
CEO information from LinkedIn. Momtaz finds that
loyal entrepreneurs need to offer fewer financial incen-
tives to attract investors and raise higher funding vol-
umes. Loyal entrepreneurs also conduct ICOs more
thoroughly and complete them in a shorter time frame.
In addition, the investors’ belief that loyal entrepreneurs
cause less agency costs proves correct in the long term;
ventures of loyal entrepreneurs are significantly less
likely to fail prematurely.
The paper contributes to the economics of loyal
behavior, e.g., Demsetz (1962) and Akerlof (1983).
More recent work has focused on the effect of loyalty
on financial decision-making. Cohen (2008) reveals that
individuals’ portfolio choices are largely determined by
their loyalty to their employers and related corporations.
The focus ofMomtaz (2020) is in the opposite direction:
the loyalty of entrepreneurs towards investors. This
relation has not been examined before.
While prior work has focused on the investment
rationale for ICO investors, i.e., the supply side of the
market (Fisch et al. 2019), Schückes and Gutmann (this
issue) focus on the motivations of startups to pursue
ICOs, i.e., the demand side of the market. Using
interview-based data, these authors find that entrepre-
neurs’ rationales for pursuing an ICO cover a multifac-
eted spectrum, including (1) funding, (2) community
building, (3) tokenomics, and (4) personal and ideolog-
ical drivers. Contrary to traditional financial theories
that often focus on financial value maximization of
financing decisions, these authors report that the
blockchain ecosystem and respective entrepreneurs de-
veloped their own social identity, which is also reflected
in their funding choice.
Boreiko and Risteski (2020) compare serial and large
ICO investors with other ICO investors. Using a large
self-collected dataset on token sales ranging from 2013
to 2017, these authors find that the average serial ICO
investor invests earlier than the other ICO investors.
However, serial investors are not more informed than
other ICO investors, per se, and fail to choose better
quality ICOs. The situation is different from large serial
investors, who seem to have an information advantage
over other ICO investors, as they are more likely to
invest in more successful ICO campaigns. The paper
contributes to the discussion of information
asymmetries that exist in ICOs (Fisch 2019). The com-
bination of investor size and investor experience seems
to reduce such asymmetries. The paper also contributes
to the discussion on the heterogeneity that exists within
the group of ICO investors (Fisch et al. 2019).
3.4 Smart contracts
Contract theory, e.g., Jensen and Meckling (1976), ex-
plains the complex situation between two parties who
do not have the same level of information (i.e.,
J. H. Block et al.
asymmetric information). Entrepreneurs constantly face
this situation with respect to their stakeholders, which
can yield the “hold-up problem.” This problem is caused
by the incomplete nature of contracts and was intro-
duced in Williamson (1985), Grossman and Hart
(1986), and Hart and Moore (1990). If a contract party
has previously entered into a relationship with another
party, the latter may try to maintain the relationship,
reflecting the importance of the commitment it has
made. The commitment is usually a substantial invest-
ment related to the procurement of the ability to deliver
goods or services. A hold-up problem, therefore, leads
to underinvestment and inefficiency in a relationship. A
historical example from the 1920s may illustrate this
problem in the most comprehensible way. The automo-
tive supplier Fisher Body had an exclusive contract with
the car manufacturer General Motors for body parts. The
supplier had a monopoly in this specific market. An
unexpected event significantly increased the demand
for cars, exceeding all the forecasts stipulated in the
contract. The supplier therefore took strong advantage
of this development and forced General Motors to sub-
stantially increase the price they would pay for the
additional parts produced.
According to Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart
andMoore (1990), the two economic actors in a contract
have the freedom to renegotiate the terms of the contract
they have already signed. However, since the surplus
generated is shared according to Nash’s equilibrium,
both parties receive a lower return on investment, which,
in turn, leads them to settle on a lower level of invest-
ment. In the end, the outcome is underinvestment. The
best situation would be to settle an agreement where no
party can interfere, that is, a negotiation-free contract.
This practice would improve trust and eliminate oppor-
tunistic behavior. Nevertheless, one evident problem in
practice results from first-time contractual relationships.
Cressy (1992) shows that agents are exposed to cogni-
tive bias, which affects their behavior in such first-time
relationships. A promising and timely approach to ad-
dress this problem seems to be the use of an IT protocol.
This approach puts agreements into a standard without
room for interference. Lindholm-Dahlstrand et al.
(2019) propose blockchain technology that may help
entrepreneurs avoid opportunistic behavior. Smart con-
tracts, such as IT protocols, between two parties could
solve the imperfections of traditional contracts because
changing the code or modifying the contract conditions
is impossible.
Meier and Sannajust (this issue) discuss whether
smart contracts are indeed appropriate to avoid oppor-
tunistic behavior and to solve the hold-up problem.
These authors develop a model based on Hart and
Moore (1999) and Hart (2009) and elaborate on the
key issue that the quality of a purchased product or
service might not be verifiable to the buyer in a world
based on blockchain technology using smart contracts.
Since contract renegotiation in such an environment is
impossible, a neutral authority, which they call “an
oracle,” needs to make a judgment about a successful
delivery of a shipped item. This oracle could follow
artificially intelligent algorithms and gain knowledge
and experience about such judgments. The oracle can
provide the buyer with a means of recourse in a world of
complete contracts where recourse is otherwise
impossible.
4 Conclusion and avenues for future research
This special issue on new markets for entrepreneurial
finance with a strong focus on ICOs is the first of its
kind. Prior research struggled to provide a clear distinc-
tion between ICOs and CF. Our editorial provides a
detailed comparison of the two entrepreneurial finance
market segments and intends to make a distinction. We
show that although both market segments are crowd-
based, they are fundamentally different with regard to
the role of platforms and the motivations of the backers.
It is important that entrepreneurs, investors, and policy
makers understand these differences. Otherwise, the
funding tools cannot live up to their full potential. When
comparing the two funding tools, many ideas for future
research emerged that we would like to share with the
entrepreneurial finance research community. We group
these ideas similar to the way in which we have struc-
tured our comparison of ICOs and CF above.
4.1 Market stakeholders
& What are the potential benefits and challenges of
ICOs? Which types of entrepreneurs seek financing
via ICOs? Which business models are funded and
which are not? What is the role of intermediaries in
ICOs?
& How do ICO investors value firms? How are ICOs
priced? How do ICO and CF platforms select firms?
How can ICO platforms or websites reduce
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information asymmetries and moral hazard prob-
lems, helping to develop a functioning ICO market
and avoiding a market for lemons? On what dimen-
sions do CF and ICOs compete?
& Who invests in ICOs, and who invests in CF cam-
paigns? How diversified are these investors? Are
they different from investors in “traditional” mar-
kets? How do companies decide to deliver voting
rights in CF and ICOs? How do investors’ motiva-
tions differ between ICOs and CF?
& What marketing-related benefits exist with CF and
ICOs, and how do they differ between the two forms
of entrepreneurial financing? How can project initi-
ators obtain information from the crowd and use this
information to improve their products or innovation,
and how are they introduced to the market? Regard-
ing ICOs, how can information about the product
move from a niche segment of technology enthusi-
asts into a mass market of regular consumers?
& How does CF relate to crowdsourcing?Which types
of relationships are generated in CF and blockchain
transactions? What do investors do after an invest-
ment? Do they interact with the entrepreneurs they
back?
4.2 Market functioning
& How do blockchain technology and cryptocurrencies
change the entrepreneurial finance ecosystem? To
what degree do ICOs and CF shift entrepreneurial
financing preferences? What are the relationships
between new and traditional entrepreneurial finance
providers? Are these providers complements or
substitutes?
& The existing literatures on CF and ICOs focus
primarily on the success factors of the campaigns.
The ultimate goal of CF and ICOs, however, is to
build an enduring business. With the exceptions of
Fisch and Momtaz (2019) as well as Howell et al.
(2018), we know little how ICOs influence real
business outcomes. What happens after the ICO
and CF offerings? How do ICOs and CF interact
in this regard?
& How do herding effects differ between CF and
ICOs? Regarding ICOs, what is the role of Bitcoin
and Etherium in creating herding effects (Masiak
et al. 2019)?
4.3 Market regulation
& Are ICOs a real financial innovation, or do they
simply help issuers circumvent securities regula-
tion? What is the nature of the potential innovation?
How should securities regulators react to different
kinds of ICO offerings?
& How and to what degree should regulation adapt to
this changing entrepreneurial finance environment?
Which countries attract ICOs and create a favorable
regulatory environment? How can the risk of bub-
bles be limited?
4.4 Market emergence and development
& What are the factors and antecedents that spur the
growth and development of ICOs versus CF? What
is the role of network effects in this regard? Are
ICOs and CF markets complementary or
substitutes?
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